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A PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE 
I 
We have been an Atlantic-minded nation and understand-
ably so. Fourteen of the states border the Atlantic. The majority 
of our ancestors reached America via the Atlantic. Most of us 
follow religions of trans-Atlantic origin. The languages that 
are learned in our schools are primarily those of t~:nations across 
the Atlantic. Americans who travel abroad usually begin their 
journeys by crossing the Atlantic. Fashions, architecture, 
routines of living in this nation all show strong influences from 
the opposite side of the ocean. We are, in short, preponderantly 
"Atlantic" by heredity, tradition, and proclivity. 
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However, the authority as well as the territory of the 
United States stops at the western edges of the ocean. The 
Atlantic has been a kind of sea barrier for us in the sense that 
the Pacific has not been. In the Pacific, not only do five states 
reach the ocean, hut one of them--Hawaii--literally emerges from 
it. In addition, we have territories of various sizes, shapes, 
and legal relationships spread through its distant reaches. The 
Aleutian Islands which project towards the Soviet Union and Japan 
are part of the State of Alaska. American Samoa, Guam, Wake, 
Johnston, Midway and the Howland, Baker and Jarvis Islands are 
far-flung dependencies. The Canton and Enderbury Islands are an 
American-British condominium. The Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands has been administered by the United States since the end 
of the Second World War; it comprises over 2,000 islands and atolls 
which together total only 678 square miles of land but wh i ch are 
dispersed over three million square miles of ocean. World War II 
left a provisional American administration in Okinawa and the 
other Ryukyu Islands; there it has remained for a quarter of a 
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century) almost within sight of the Asian mainland. More than 
a frontier, more than an avenue of communication and trade, the 
Pacific is a vast muine-arena within which lie states, territories, 
and dependencies appertaining in large part to the United States . 
I would like to make clear that in referring to the 
Pacific, I do not include the Asian mainland or the waters 
immediately adjacent. On that mainland, there are no American 
possessions but there are more American forces than anywhere else 
in the world outside the United States. Not only is there the 
immense consignment in Viet Nam hut large American military con-
tingents are also stationed in Thailand and South Korea. For 
the first time in history, we have deployed military power in 
mass along the whole arc of the Asian mainland. 
In this manner, almost without realizing it, we have 
cast ourselves in the role of Asian power. We have extended the 
outposts of our Pacific power to China 1 s borders. We have done 
so on the assumption that China is bent on military expansion 
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and that it is essential for the United States to contain that 
expansion. That we have erred in the form of our response,even 
if the assumptions are accurate, is illustrated, in my judgment, 
by the war in Viet Nam. The war has not contained China in any 
sense. Nor has it even decreased Chinese influence in Viet Nam. 
If anything, it may be having the opposite effect . 
What needs most to be learned from the tragic experi-
ence in Viet Nam is that there is no national interest of the 
United States which requires us to perform the functions of an 
Asian power. On the contrary, it is as self-damaging as it is 
futile to presume that that role can be exercised by an outside 
power anywhere on the Asian land-mass. The fact is that the 
nations of Asia are going to develop along economic and political 
lines which are determined by themselves. The development will 
spring from their history, philosophy, and tradition. It will 
be hased on their human and material resources. It will reflect 
the political realities of their surroundings. 
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Nations outside the region, perhaps, can participate 
economically in limited ways in this process, but they cannot 
control the social evolution of Asia. What applies to other 
outside nations applies to us. We have never been a part of the 
Asian continent. We are not now. We will not be in the future. 
However, we are a part of the Pacific, as I have 
already observed, and we will continue to be. Whether we will 
remain a Pacific power is not in question ; we have no choice. 
What is at issue is our future role with respect to Asia. On 
that score, it seems to me, the character of our commitment is 
largely a matter of our choice. We were not forced, for example, 
into the present involvement in Viet Nam. Largely by a pyramid-
ing of successive unilateral declarations and acts, the commit-
ment was built to its great dimensions. The choice was ours. 
By the same token, this nation, through the President, still 
retains, in my judgment, the capacity to increase, reduce, or 
even to dismantle that commitment by its own calculated decisions. 
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Whatever else may prove true of our future role in 
Asian affairs, I am persuaded that it will differ from the role 
we have played in the past. The postwar World War II era has 
ended, whether or not we recognize it. Whether or not we realize 
it, we are in a period of transition in our relations with the 
nations of the Western Pacific. 
II 
That such is the case is best illustrated by reference 
to Japan. Our relations with that nation have been relatively 
qure~ent for many years. Time has brought changes in Japan which 
have now reached a point just short of crisis. 
The cloud on the horizon is the U. s. -Japan security 
treaty. Under the terms of the treaty, beginning in 1970 either 
party may announce an intent to amend or terminate the agreement. 
As this date has drawn closer, the political debate in Japan over 
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the treaty has grown in intensity. It has centered on two 
apecific points. 
The first is the question of the American bases in 
Japan--number, location and use. Among the Japanese, there has 
been a growing resentment of these bases. They are not uniformly 
regarded as sources of a benevolent American protection. Often, 
they are seen as symbols of excessive foreign influence as well 
as hazardous nauisances. Furthermore, U. S. military airfields, 
on occasion, act to disturb the populace, not only because they 
occupy scarce land, but also because they pose dangers of acci-
dental explosions and crashes. In the case of naval bases there 
is, in Hiro~a-conscious Japan, the additional concern with the 
assumed danger of radiation whenever nuclear-powered U. S. vessels 
call at these facilities. 
The second specific issue around which the debate has 
centered in Japan is the question of the Ryukyu Islands (notably 
Okinawa), which were an integral part of Japan before World War II 
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At the end of that conflict, the United States occupied these 
islands and has since administered them through the Defense 
Department . The Japanese peace treaty of l95l,however, left 
dangling, so to speak, certain matters pertaining to their final 
disposition. While the United States retained administrative 
control, Japan was not required to relinquish sovereignty. 
Moreover, this nation has since stated on more than one occasion 
that there is no question that Japan possesses 11 residual'' sover-
eignty over the Ryukyus. 
Nevertheless, the United States has converted Okinawa 
into a great military depot. Bases on the island are specifically 
exempted from certain restrictions which are in effect on similar 
U. S. installations in Japan proper . In 1960 the United States 
agreed that bases on the Japanese main islands cannot be used 
for "military combat operations" without the agreement of the 
Japanese government but by contrast the same inhibition is not 
in effect in Okinawa which has served as a staging area for the 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 44, Folder 62, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 9 -
war in Viet Nam and for B-52 bomber operations. Finally, there 
is a most fundamental difference: we have agreed not to store 
nuclear weapons in Japan proper; there is no such agreement 
respecting Okinawa. 
The military bases relate to the larger issue of Japan's 
future military role in the Pacific . What is involved in this 
question is the continuance of a situation in which the primary 
responsibility for defending Japan, and indeed the entire Western 
Pacific, falls to the United States . Over the years, this state 
of affairs has cost us untold .billions of dollars. Its persist-
ence is now beginning to appear somewhat anacronistic a quarter 
of a century after World War II and with a Japan that is the 
third greatest industrial power in the world. 
Many Japanese are restless under U. S . military sur-
veillance of their homeland and adjacent waters . On the other 
hand, there is also a conflicting factor of Japanese anxiety 
that American military protection may be withdrawn . Out of the 
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dichotomy has come a view that Japan should rearm beyond the 
modeQt ' self defense" forces which it possesses and assume a 
part of th~ defense functions which are now being discharged by 
this nation. The view has adherents not only in Japan but in 
certain quarters in the United States. 
All of the issues which I have discussed so far have 
a significant characteristic in common; they are military matters 
There are, of course, also non-military matters in dispute between 
Japan anq the United States as, for example, certain barriers to 
trade and investment. The fact remains, nevertheless, that the 
main source of friction in U. s.-Japanese relations, today~ is . 
to be foun4 in disagreement over military questions. I emphasize 
this point because there has been some tendency to avoid public 
consideration of these matters in connection with foreign policy. 
Yet, the questions are fundamental. The future of the U. s.-
Japanese relationship will be very shaky, indeed, if we proceeq 
to try to base it preponderantly on our military convenience in 
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the Pacific, notwithstanding the irritation and hostility which 
may be caused thereby in Japan. 
It seems to me there is a need for great alertness to 
changing Japanese attitudes respecting our military activities. 
While some sentiment already exists in Japan for the removal of 
all U. S. military bases, I do not think that that is the dominant 
view. There is, rather, a general desire to see a reduction in 
the number of U. S. bases in Japan. A prompt response to this 
desire, I believe, not only would meet Japanese wishes but would 
also correspond to the interests of this nation. Certainly, it 
would dovetail with our present effort to reduce federal expendi-
tures and, in particular, expenditures abroad. In my judgment, 
it would also act, in timely fashion, to preserve an accommodat -
ing tone in u. s .-Japanese relations. 
Indeed, I am persuaded that much of the growing con-
troversy with Japan could be dispelled if it were simply stated 
that we are prepared to abide by Japanese desires respecting the 
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bases. The installations are maintained at great cost to this 
nation on the grounds of the contribution which they make to 
Japanese security and, hence, indirectly to the security of the 
United States. If the bases have now ceased to have that function 
in Japanese calculations, how can they possibly serve a useful 
purpose in ours? They become, in fact, a growing liability if 
they cause mounting friction between this nation and the Japanese 
populace. 
Whatever the sentiments on the question of American 
bases in Japan, Okinawa is the looming issue in J apanese-American 
relations. It is the lightning r od, so to speak, which has 
attracted most of the a rguments, most of the protests, and most 
of the attention. 
There is strong and growing pressure within Japan and 
Okinawa for the immediate repossession of full control over the 
Ryukyus . It seems to me that we have delayed a long time--perhaps 
too long--on this sensitive issue. Okinawa is Japanese ; we have 
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never claimed otherwise. I see no just or rational alternative 
other than to try to arrive at a fixed time-schedule for the 
progressive and prompt return of administrative control over the 
Ryukyu Islands to Japan. In restoring Japanese administrative 
control over Okinawa, moreover, it seems to me that there are 
also strong arguments against insisting on a "deal '1 which will 
permit the use of the military bases in ways which are not 
acceptahle to the Japanese people . 
There will be, I am sure, cries of anguish in some 
quarters at any significant modification of our right to unre-
stricted use of Okinawa . Nevertheless, entrenched parochial 
interests cannot be permitted to prevail in this critical matter . 
Okinawa is undoubtedly a great military convenience but it is by 
no means indispensable . The fact is that there have been enormous 
technological developments in the military field since World War 
II. We now have missiles which can carry nuclear weapons into 
space . We have planes which can carry them in the atmosphere 
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over the ocean. We have ships which can carry them on the ocean, 
and submarines which can carry them under the ocean. We also 
have other bases in the Pacific--bases which are under unchal- ~ 
lenged American sovereignty--where nuclear weapons can be stored 
and where Strategic Air Command planes with nuclear weapons may 
be based without question or complaint. 
As I have already noted, the issues of the bases and 
Okinawa relate to the larger question of Japan's future military 
r ole. Here, too, it seems to me, that a greater sensitivity to 
Japanese popular sentiment is essential . It would appear · .. 
particula rly ill-advised for the United States to try to push 
the Japanese towards a new and expanded military r ole in the 
Western Pacific. To be sure, the Japanese may one day raise the 
present level of their self-defense f orces. They may even, one 
day, amend their constitution in order to possess other tha n 
self-defense forces. Any such dec isions, however, should result 
from J a panese political processes which reflect Ja pa nese judgments 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 44, Folder 62, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 15 -
of Japanese needs--judgments for which the Japanese accept full 
responsibility. They should not result from American pressures 
reflecting American judgments of American needs and, for which, 
this nation in the end will have to hear responsibility. 
III 
If the Japanese do not assume the military burdens 
which the U. S. would relinquish when the bases in Japan a re 
reduced in number and those on Okinawa a re restricted in use, 
some will ask: who will defend the Pacific? Presumably, it is 
fear of China which gives rise to this question. It does not 
follow, however, if the Chinese are hound on expansion, that 
they are capable of trans-Pacific aggression. Indeed, President 
Nixon has made it clear that he does not buy the contention of 
some defense advisors that a "thin' anti-ballistics missiles 
system is needed because of the Chinese threat. 
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A thrust of military power across the Pacific is quite 
a different matter from expansion on the Asian continent. Even 
in the latter case there is a difference of view as to the nature 
of Chinese continental pressure and what constitutes the principal 
danger to orderly progress in Asia. Among the nations of Southeas 
Asia, for example, it is commonplace to find that the threat of 
Chinese military aggression is rated a more remote menace than 
the immediate problems of economic underdevelopment and political 
instability which, in some cases, stem from internal economic 
disparities and in others from conflicts between two or more 
countries within the region. 
These latter problems can hardly be met by U. S. defense 
outposts in the Western Pacific. Rather, their solution requires 
cooperation for constructive purposes among the Southeast Asian 
nations and with other nations outside the region. In fact, such 
cooperation has begun and it is taking two forms. First, there 
are groups of states within the region, such as the newly formed 
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Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Second, there are 
regional organizations with outside members, such as the Asian 
Development Bank. The Bank includes European and North AMerican 
subscribers whose modern resources can play an important, if 
peripheral, part in the progress of the Asian nations. 
In this connection, there seems to me to be considerable 
merit in Japanese suggestions that the United States, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan should form a 11 Pacific community 
to help developing countries. I should add, that in a grouping 
of this kind, Japan can play a most significant part. Indeed, 
in my judgment, it is in the sphere of economic development 
wherein lies Japan's principal potential for a contribution to 
the peace and progress of the Western Pacific. 
IV 
I have talked of several facets of the situation in an 
effort to place the needs of our Asian policies in clearer per-
spective;of the distinction between a Pacific power which we have 
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and 
no choice but to be/an Asian power which we can and should choose 
not to be; of our military relations with Japan and the heat which 
is rising from the issues of the bases, Okinawa, and the over-all 
Japanese role in the security of the Western Pacific; and, finally, 
of economic development in the Asian countries and the possibilitie 
of cooperative aid . Trere are several other related questions 
which need to be touched on to complete this discussion. One 
concerns our relations with mainland China. 
Strictly speaking, Chi na is not of the Pacific but of 
Asia. Yet, the very vastness of China projects its relevance 
not only over the Asian mainland and the Pacific but, in fact, 
throughout the entire world. It is not possible to talk about 
the future of international peace, let alone about our future 
in the Pacific, without reference to the gr eat nation which 
lies on its farther shore . 
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China will not remain forever, as is now the case, in 
substantial isolation. Its proper role is as a leading nation 
in the councils of the world. Sooner or later China will assume 
that place. It seems to me the Japanese have long since come to 
recognize that prospect. And there are indications that they are 
seeking to bridge the gap with China. Even if we could, there is 
no cause for this nation to impose obstacles of any kind--either 
spoken or unspoken--to increasing Japanese contacts with China. 
On the contrary, such efforts--whether in the economic, cultural, 
or political fields--might well be encouraged. They can serve 
not only Japan's needs for trade, they can contribute to clearing 
up a whole range of enigmas involving China and the security of 
the Western Pacific. In that fashion, they can be helpful in 
bringing about an enlightened approach to the building of a stable 
peace in that region. 
For our part, and for much the same reasons, I see no 
purpose in imposing any special restrictj_ons on the travel of 
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Americans to China. Nor do I see any reason not to place trade 
with China in non-strategic goods on the same basis as trade with 
the Soviet Union, Poland, and other Communist countries. For a 
decade and a half we have sought to maintain a rigid primary and 
secondary boycott of Chinese goods. The effort is unique in our 
history and it finds no parallel among the present practices of 
other nations with respect to China. In my view, we would be 
well advised to abandon this antiquated pursuit of China's down-
fall by economic warfare and treat with the Chinese in matters of 
trade as we treat with European Communist countries--no better 
and no worse. 
It seems to me, the Nixon Administration's announced 
intention tD reopen previous offers to exchange journalists, 
scientists, and scholars with China is well founded. The cancel-
lation of the meeting in Warsaw on February 20, at which these 
offers were to be reiterated, is regrettable. One can only hope 
that another opportunity will soon present itself and, hopefully, 
that the official offers will be made and accepted. 
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Trade, travel, and cultural and scientific exchanges are 
relatively tangible issues in our relationship with China. Hence, 
they seem to be more readily amenahle to solution; perhaps, that 
is why current discussion of the relationship with China tends to 
concentrate on them. Similarly, the present debate is intensive 
on the questions of Chinese admission to the Untted Nations and 
U. S. diplomatic recognition of Peking. These issues, too, seem 
susceptible to clear solution. They are not, however, at the root 
of the difficulties. To try to resolve them at this point may be 
a useful intellectual exercise hut it also tends to put the cart 
of the difficulty before the horse. 
The fundamental problem of U. S.-Chinese relations is 
the status of Taiwan. It is a problem which is as complex as it 
is crucial . It is not an either-or issue. It is not really 
soluble, in an enduring sense, in ~erms of two Chinas·as has·been 
suggested in recent years because there are 
the attempt to delineate them is synthetic. 
not two Chinas and l 
The fact is that 
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China is a part of Taiwan and Taiwan is a part of China. Both 
Chinese governments which are agreed on little else are agreed 
on that score. The question is not whether the twain shall meet 
but when and in what circumstances. While we are not aloof from 
this question, the decisions which appertain thereto involve 
primarily the Chinese themselves--the Chinese of the mainland 
and the Chinese of Taiwan. Sooner or later the decisions will 
have to begin to be made. Only then will the other part of the 
Chinese puzzle--such questions as U. S. recognition and U. N. 
admission--fall into a rational place in our policies. 
v 
While I have spoken today principally about the United 
States, Japan, and China, two other major nations are of 
immediate concern. I refer to the Republic of the 
Philippines and to Indonesia. 
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There are signs of difficulties in our relations with 
the Philippines, principally in the field of trade and investment 
and with respect to U. S. military bases. In my judgment, however, 
none of the problems which confront us is of a nature as to be 
beyond reasonable solution in the light of the general cooperation 
which we have long enjoyed with the Philippines. Yet it is pre-
cisely this basic cooperation which seems to me now to be in 
jeopardy. It is adversely affetted by a vestigiru tendency--a 
hang-over from pre-independence days--to continue to think almost 
automatically in terms of special economic privileges and conces-
sions. Similarly in the field of foreign relations there is an 
inclination to expect that the policy of the Philippines govern-
ment, inevitably, will mirror our own attitudes . Therefore, such 
departures as the recent Philippine initiation of contact with 
Communist countries seems somehow inimical to continued warm 
U. S.-Philippines relations . That istronic inasmuch as we have 
l ong since had contact with most of these countries . 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 44, Folder 62, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 24 -
It is not a law of nature--it is an Aesopian fable--
that familiarity must always breed contempt. A half century of 
familiarity which was crowned with the common sacrifices of World 
War II laid the basis not for a mutual contempt but for an endur-
ing friendship between the Filipino and American people . It 
seems to me that we need to bestir ourselves now if this mutually 
valuable tie ts not to be lost. Indeed, it would be my hope that 
the new Administration would give prompt attention to this matter. 
To allow barriers of estrangement to be raised, by 
negligence or nonsense, is to admit a serious disability in our 
capacity to order our relations with other countries, notably 
those which have gained independence since World War II. After 
all, if we cannot hold the c ~nfidence, the friendship, and the 
respect of a people with whom we have been intimately associated 
for half-a-century, what can be expected with regard t o other 
nations in Asia with which we have had little or no historic 
connection ? 
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Indonesia is one such nation. Formerly the Dutch East 
Indies, this immense island chain was largely unknown to Americans 
during the colonial era. In the post-independence period, there 
has been a considerable contact but it has been uneven and unpre-
dictable. In recent years, there has been a deterioration which, 
at times, has reached almost the point of outright mutual hostility. 
The pendulum apparently is now swinging and hope exists once again 
for a more agreeable situation. 
It will take time, h~wever, for us to form a balanced 
view of this enormous island-nation which in terms of population 
is the sixth largest in the world. It will take time, too, for 
Indonesia to emerge from its accumulated political and economic 
ills. The burden of the past is heavy and pervasive. 
The United States can do little to speed up the develop-
ment of a better association with Indonesia . Indeed in present 
circumstances the best policy is to accept our own limitations 
in this regard. To be sure, there are the gestures of goodwill 
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which can be made in the form of technical, scientific, and 
educational cooperation. Moreover, through regional aid channels, 
such as I have already discussed, some assistance can be provided 
to Indonesia for economic development. That is a far cry, however, 
from self-delusive assumptions that by sending Americans to fight 
in Viet Nam we have somehow saved Indonesia from Communism or 
that the astute efforts of U. S . agencies and enough money in 
some miraculous fashion can act to delineate the emerging struc-
ture of the Indonesian nation. 
VII 
Having described the problems which confront the Un j ted 
States in the Pacific, I feel that I have an obligation to close 
with a few general words of prescription. Almost fifty years of 
association with the Pacific--as a student, Marine, teacher, and 
frequent visitor--prompt me to do so. A quarter of a century of 
political experience, on the other hand, impel me in the othe r 
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direction . In these years of specializing in foreign relations 
both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate I have 
come to recognize the general absence of finality in the disposi -
tion of major international problems. 
Nevertheless, I did remark at the outset that whatever 
our future in the Pacific, that future will be unlike the past . 
I am now under SJme compulsion to fill in details which sustain 
the general observation . The most fundamental new factor in the 
situation, as I see it, is the appearance of at least one new 
generation since my generation began to grapple with the post-
World War II Asian situation and, in particular and with a 
singular lack of effectiveness, with the monumental upheaval of 
the Chinese revolution. This new generation is a source o f hope 
for the future . It is a hope which derives largely fr Jm the 
interest young peo ple now take in the affairs of the other side 
of the Pacific. That interest is more profound and far better 
informed than was the case two decades or more ago . 
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It used to be that in an 'Atlantic-minded' nation the 
consideration of Asian questions was left largely to a relative 
handful of Americans, to "old Asian'' or :old China hands, ., whose 
attitudes were churned out of a mixture of 19th century religious 
altruism, political idealism, cold-cash imperialism, and unscru-
pulous adventurism . World War II altered this mixture; the Korean 
War modified it further; and now Viet Nam has changed it greatly. 
The attitudes which once held sway in this nation with respect to 
our relations with Asia and the Pacific have lost most of their 
relevance and much of their potency. 
If there is to be a worthwhile future in the Pacific, 
it seems to me that U. S. policies for the problems of the Asian 
littoral will not be left in 11 old Asian hands. '' Rather they will 
take on the sense and sensitivity of '' young American hands. '' The 
problems will be dealt with in a new spirit of cooperation and 
collaboration, free of attitudes of dominance or condescension. 
The keynote of a new policy for contemporary Asia, as I see it, 
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is mutuality. Its characteristics will be mutual respect, mutual 
appreciation, and mutual forebearance. 
For us there is no choice. We must make the effort to 
put our policies into that perspective. We will not only con-
tinue to live in the Pacific, we will also have to learn to live 
with the Pacific and the nations of tts western reaches, basing 
our relations with its peoples--with the Chinese, Japanese, 
Filipinos, Koreans, Indonesians, and others--henceforth, on 
a profound respect for the equal dignity and worth of all. 
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